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A NAVY ESCROW ACCOUNT: 
INCREASING FINANCIAL FLEXIBILITY 
Introduction 
The current fiscally constrained environment creates 
several challenges for Department of the Navy (DoN) and 
Department of Defense (DoD) financial managers.  One of the 
most critical is balancing operational requirements with 
the need to replace aging assets such as ships, aircraft, 
and facilities.  To that end, transforming the current 
financial practices within the DoN/DoD is required. 
This paper addresses the proposed Navy escrow account, 
a mechanism for eliminating wasteful spending while 
maximizing all available financial resources.  The account, 
as envisioned, would provide financial managers with the 
incentive to generate cost savings and the means by which 
those funds could be recapitalized. 
The creation of an escrow account coincides with the 
Navy’s Sea Enterprise initiative, the resource enabler of 
Sea Power 21.  Sea Enterprise builds upon the three 
strategic imperatives of changing the culture, changing 
structure and processes, and harvesting savings.1 
 
Previous Programs – The “M” And Merged Surplus Accounts 
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Retention of unobligated and/or surplus funds is not a 
new concept within the DoD.  Starting in 1956, the DoD 
maintained the “M” Account – for obligated but unexpended 
budget authority and the Merged Surplus Account – for 
budget authority that had not been obligated.2  They 
provided a mechanism for retaining control of appropriated 
funds, whether unobligated or unexpended balances, within 
the agencies creating the obligations and effectively 
eliminated the need for additional congressional action to 
cover upward adjustments. 
The rapid growth of the M Account mirrored the 
expansion of the DoD budget in the 1980’s (Figure 1).  The 
balance within the two accounts would reach $45.9 billion 
by 1990 and, surprisingly, went largely unnoticed by 
Congress. 
 




























However, following the Air Force’s admission that it 
planned to use roughly $1 billion from the M Account for 
B1-B avionics upgrades in 1989, the accounts began to draw 
considerable congressional interest.3  Perceiving that the 
DoD, through the M and Merged Surplus Accounts was 
circumventing congressional intent, Congress began the 
process of enacting new legislation.  With the signing of 
P.L. 101-510, the M and Merged Surplus accounts were 
eliminated as of September 30, 1993. 
 
Current Tools - Transfer Authority and Reprogramming 
With the elimination of the Merged Surplus account, 
the ability to redistribute funds within the DoD was 
significantly reduced.  Although current legislation and 
DoD regulations provide for the transfer of funds between 
appropriations and the reprogramming of funds within 
appropriations, there are two significant limitations:  1) 
the amounts available for transfer and reprogramming are 
limited and 2) the procedure can be lengthy. 
The congressionally established transfer limit in the 
FY2002 Defense Appropriations Act of $2 billion, although 
not insignificant, represents roughly half of one percent 
of the total DoD appropriation.  In terms of reprogramming 
authority, thresholds are established in the DoD Financial 
Management Regulations, beyond which, congressional 
approval is required to reprogram funds.  As an example, a 
cumulative increase of $15 million or more in Operations 
and Maintenance (O&M) funds within a budget activity 
requires congressional approval.4 
However, the procedures for gaining such approval have 
proven to be lengthy.  In his FY2004 Defense Budget 
Testimony for the House Armed Services Committee (HASC), 
Secretary of Defense Donald H. Rumsfeld commented: 
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”The Department of Defense spends an average of 
$42 million an hour – yet we are not allowed to 
move $15 million from one account to another 
without getting permission from 4-6 different 
congressional Committees, a process that can take 
several months to complete.” 5 
The Navy Escrow Account 
The proposed Navy escrow account provides a buffer for 
rapidly shifting requirements and budgetary shortfalls in a 
more efficient and effective manner than current transfer 
authority and reprogramming capabilities.  It creates an 
incentive for generating cost savings and the means to 
redistribute those savings toward emergent financial 
demands or unfunded requirements.  It is a tool for 
transforming the business operations within the DoN:  away 
from a “zero balance” baseline and towards prudent 
financial stewardship. 
Conceptually, the Navy escrow account would function 
in a similar manner to the traditional escrow accounts.  
Funds will be transferred to the account from anticipated 
savings or savings in the execution phase, and held for 
future payment of legitimate obligations. 
 
Navy Escrow Account Input Process 
The funding inputs to the Navy escrow account will 
originate at three distinct periods within the budget 
cycle:  during the build of the Program Objective 
Memorandum (POM), during the execution phase, or at the end 
of the fiscal year.  The quality of the savings, in terms 
of the probability of fully realizing their value, varies 
at each phase.  During the POM build, the savings are 
theorized; based on efficiency measures or programs that 
are projected to generate savings.  As such, there is a 
possibility that some savings will not materialize as 
predicted, possibly affecting operational capability.  
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Alternatively, the savings realized during the execution 
phase and approaching the end of the fiscal year (August to 
September timeframe) will present fewer opportunities to 
influence operations. 
 



































To help mitigate some of the risk associated with the 
early identification/transfer of funds in the POM process, 
a percentage system, based on the confidence of the 
projected savings, could be established.  This would not 
only provide funds for programs facing shortfalls, but also 
a goal for the command projecting the savings to reach and 
a safety net if circumstances prohibit the savings from 
being realized.  Figure 2 outlines the potential POM 
transfer process. 
The process for harvesting savings during execution 
will originate from top-down and bottom-up initiatives.  As 
in the current process, the Mid-Year Review will play a 
critical role in designating potential savings.  However, 
for the process to be successful there must be a shift in 
the mental models that guide the review processes.  In lieu 
of rushing to obligate, commands must adopt a more 
inclusive corporate view of budget execution:  spending 
funds when warranted, reducing outflows when able. 
 






















With each day approaching the end of the fiscal year, 
the level of risk from harvesting funds decreases.  As 
such, the proposed process for harvesting end of the year 
funds is simplified when compared with the other harvesting 
periods:  funds not obligated at the end of the fiscal year 
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are available for transfer into the Navy escrow account.  
However, if shortfalls exist within the DoN, harvested 
funds will first be transferred into the required 
appropriations, with the balance forwarded to the escrow 
account.  Figure 3 highlights the flow of funds. 
 With each source of funds, there are advantages and 
disadvantages.  Table 1 outlines the critical factors 
associated with POM, execution, and end of the year funds. 
 
Table 1 Input Advantages and Disadvantages 
Origin Advantages Disadvantages 
POM 1. Provides an incentive/goal 
for execution. 
2. Potential source of funds 
for programs facing known 
shortfalls. 
3. Provides more time to make 
strategically smart 
financial decisions 
1. External and internal 
competition for funds may 
eliminate savings. 
2. Mission readiness suffers 
due to reductions. 
3. Top-down reductions may not 
gain support at lower 
levels. 
Execution 1. Provides an incentive for 
execution. 
2. Institutionalizes a 
cultural shift away from 
the 100% obligation 
mindset. 
3. Increase fiscal 
flexibility. 
1. Reluctance to relinquish 
budget authority. 
2. Fear of the unknown or 
emergent requirement. 
3. Difficult to create the 
required “shared vision” 
for successful 
implementation. 
Fiscal Year End 1. Savings easily identified. 
2. Helps eliminate end of the 
year rush to obligate 100% 
of budget authority. 
3. Increases scrutiny of 4th 
quarter spending. 
1. Fear of negatively 
affecting future budgets – 
“spend it or lose it” 
mentality. 
2. Desire to spend for 
upcoming year’s 
requirements. 
3. Cancellation of valid local 





Navy Escrow Account Uses 
Utilization of Navy escrow account funds fall into 
three distinct categories: funds to cover unexpected 
shortfalls, funds to resource previously unfunded 
requirements, and funds to be applied to future 
obligations.  From the standpoint of gaining widespread 
acceptance, specifically from Congress, covering shortfalls 
with internally derived resources is a critical aspect of 
fund utilization.  Although the concept of covering 
existing shortfalls as the first priority seems logical, 
this has not always been the practice.  During the 1980’s, 
as the Merged Surplus account continued to grow, DoD 
received over $11.25 billion in six supplemental 
appropriations.6 
 The second claimant on escrow funds will be unfunded 
requirements.  These requirements may be in the form of a 
congressionally pre-approved and prioritized list created 
annually or simply as an emergent requirement (e.g., 
additional Joint Direct Attack Munitions). 
 The third manner in which Navy escrow account funds 
may be utilized is in their application towards future 
years’ obligations.  These may be programs or procurements 
planned in the future that can be readily supported by the 
requisite contractors and existing infrastructure. 
 
Balance Adjudication 
The preferred process for the Navy escrow account is 
to have all transferred funds lose their fiscal year 
identity and original purpose, essentially becoming “no 
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year – no color” funds.  This provides the greatest 
flexibility and allows for prudent financial decisions to 
be made without time or purpose restrictions. 
Other possibilities include the development of a share 
ratio between the DoN and the general Treasury, where a 
given percentage of funds remains within the DoN and while 
the remaining balance is transferred to the general 
Treasury.  This obviously minimizes the incentives to Navy 
financial managers, but may provide a necessary level of 
congressional oversight to make the account politically 
acceptable. 
 A third possibility is the creation of obligation 
periods and/or balance limits.  Under this scenario, funds 
transferred into the Navy escrow account may be available 
for obligation for a designated time-period or up to a 
certain amount.  Funds would be transferred with a specific 
date tag that would result in a given obligation period for 
the funds.  The obligation periods may be similar to 
existing limitations such as one year for O&M or three 
years for Aircraft Procurement, Navy (APN) from the time 
they are transferred into the escrow account.  The balance 
limits may be based on a specific dollar amount or 
percentage of total obligational authority (TOA) for a 
given fiscal year. 
 
Levels of Control 
There would be two levels of control for the Navy 
escrow account:  those internal to the DoN and those 
external.  Within the DoN, to achieve the maximum benefit, 
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the Navy escrow account should operate under corporate 
control.  As noted by the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO), 
Admiral Vern Clark: 
“What would make a local commander think he has a 
better use of [generated] savings, than corporate 
headquarters?”7 
 
The proposed process would have the respective Program 
Sponsors submitting proposals based on fleet inputs to the 
Resource Sponsors, who would then present a unified plan to 
the Deputy Chief of Naval Operations (Resources, 
Requirements and Assessments - N8) for submission to the 
Office of the CNO.  This process has the potential, as seen 
in reprogramming battles, to be lengthy.  However, 
mitigation of escrow decisions and creation of an unfunded 
requirements list could be made in a fashion similar to 
current budget decisions. 
As such, the CNO, Commandant of the Marine Corps, FMB, 
Assistant Secretary of the Navy (Financial Management and 
Comptroller)(ASN(FM&C), and the Secretary of the Navy would 
play active roles in the final review of the unfunded 
requirements list.  Reducing the decision making time and 
internal battles for increased budget authority is clearly 
one of the most difficult, internal challenges to 
successful implementation. 
External controls would focus on gaining DoD approval, 
through the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), and 
congressional approval, through a House and Senate 
Appropriations Committees (HAC and SAC), as well as the 
House and Senate Armed Services Committees (HASC and SASC).  
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A notification process, with a specified time allotted for 
review, could be established to expedite the process. 
The final level of review is the presence of an 
external audit and standardized reporting procedures.  
Figure 4 graphically summarizes the proposed operation of 
the Navy escrow account. 
 
























































Potential Model Programs 
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Although there is no one existing program in 
operation, on any scale, that contains all of the 
functionality desired in the Navy escrow account, several 
programs have established the precedence for the 
recapitalization or future application of actualized 
savings. 
In preparation for the FY2001 and FY2002 budgets and 
as part of the “Smart Work” concept, Budget Submitting 
Offices (BSOs) were encouraged to review manning 
requirements for the various commands under their auspices.8 
 The program enabled Commanders to eliminate non-
essential billets or those that did not optimize mission 
accomplishment.  The critical mechanism and incentive 
within the program was an ability to reapply any savings 
achieved to unfunded approved program requirements.  
Proposals for reapplying savings were evaluated in the 
budget review process and subsequently approved if they 
were consistent with manpower management goals and 
departmental and service priorities.9 
The reapplication of savings was similarly established 
in the Military Housing Privatization Initiative (MHPI) and 
the Family Housing Improvement Fund (FHIF).10  MHPI enables 
the DoD to work with the private sector to build and 
renovate military housing.  Funds deposited into the FHIF 
originate primarily from direct appropriations and the 
transfer of appropriated Family Housing construction funds. 
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The account is limited to a total budget authority of 
$850 million and all transfers must be for a defined 
project and at the full, appropriated value of the project.  
However, within the FHIF, considerable flexibility exists.  
Unobligated funds from one project can be transferred into 
the FHIF.  They can then be obligated for a project from 
the Family Housing Master Plan in the same or different 
location.  For projects requiring the transfer of funds 
into the FHIF, a 30-day congressional notification period 
is required.11 
Within the FHIF, the funds retain their original 
purpose – family housing.  However, other DoD programs, 
such as those designed to improve the conservation of 
energy and water at DoD facilities, provide the ability to 
utilize savings in other areas.  Two programs are 
noteworthy: 
• Title 10 U.S.C. § 2865 – Energy savings 
• Title 42 U.S.C. § 8287 – Energy Savings 
Performance Contracts (ESPC)12 
 
Included in these measures are provisions for 
retaining portions of the savings beyond the current fiscal 
year and obligating those savings towards unrelated, but 
defined, projects and/or programs. 
Title 10 U.S.C. § 2865 allows the retention of two-
thirds of the appropriated funds resulting from the energy 
cost savings initiatives remaining at the end of the fiscal 
year.13  An annual recurring provision contained in the DoD 
appropriations acts allows the remaining balance to be 
available for obligation into the following fiscal year. 
The savings not obligated in the current fiscal year 
are subsequently transferred into an extended availability 
account.  They are available for expenditure for five years 
following the year in which the funds expired for 
obligation at the end of the year of extended availability 
– a total of six years. 
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One-third of the savings must be used at the 
installation where the savings were realized, at the 
discretion of the Commanding Officer.  Notably, the funds 
can be used for improvements to existing family housing, 
unspecified minor construction improving the quality of 
life for personnel, and any morale, welfare, or recreation 
(MWR) facility or service. 
Title 42 U.S.C. § 8287 is an amendment to Section 736 
of the National Defense Authorization Act for FY1989.  
Section 736 addresses ESPCs, which enable Federal agencies 
to improve the energy efficiency of their facilities 
without depending on congressional appropriations for 
capital improvements.  As compensation for the capital 
investments, the private firms are awarded a share of the 
savings during the term of the contract (not to exceed 25 
years).14 
 The total cost savings realized during the first five 
years of the ESPC are available for obligation.  Of the 
funds generated through an ESPC program, one-half may be 
used for any MWR facility or service or for any minor 
military construction project enhancing the quality of life 
of military members at the installation at which the 
savings were realized. 
 
Statutory Barriers 
Although the proposed escrow account increases 
financial flexibility, there are significant statutory 
barriers prohibiting its creation.  Within the various 
codes that govern the financial practices of the United 
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States Armed Forces, there are two distinct categories:  
codes that define the appropriation process and codes that 
define the obligation/expenditure process. 
 
Appropriations Process  
The overarching restriction applicable to the 
appropriations process and the foundation for many of the 
other relevant codes is found in the United States 
Constitution, Article I, section 9, clause 7.  The text is 
as follows: 
“No money shall be drawn from the treasury, but 
in consequence of appropriations made by law.”15 
 
Additionally, the requirement for “authorization in 
law” exists throughout Title 10 United States Code 
(U.S.C.).  Defining the specific requirements for the armed 
forces, Title 10 contains numerous applicable sections that 
prohibit the flexibility desired in the Navy escrow 
account: 
• Title 10 U.S.C. § 114 – defines the potential 
sources for obligations within the Armed Forces 
(e.g., aircraft, weapons, operations and 
maintenance, etc.). 
• Title 10 U.S.C. § 2802 - further defines the 
scope of actions characterized as military 
construction. 
• Title 10 U.S.C. § 2821 – details additional 
requirements for construction and acquisition 
of military family housing. 
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The escrow account, as proposed, will operate outside 
of the standard appropriations process and in conflict with 
the aforementioned statutory requirements.  There are 
several possibilities for creating a mechanism that 
complies with the letter and intent of the existing laws 
governing the appropriations process.  For each corrective 
action, there is an associated probability of gaining 
congressional approval and a respective increase in overall 
DoD/DoN flexibility.  Figure 5 highlights the continuum of 
possibilities.  
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Obligation and Expenditure Processes 
 The statutory limitations governing the obligation and 
expenditure processes are contained in Title 31 U.S.C.  The 
individual sections provide guidelines as to the purpose, 
time, and amounts available for obligation.  Accordingly, 
they each present a different challenge in the 
implementation of the Navy escrow account. 
Title 31 U.S.C. § 1301 establishes the requirement to 
maintain the application or purpose of appropriated funds.16  
Commonly referred to as the “color of money” statute, it 
prohibits the obligation of appropriated funds for any 
purpose other than that originally stated. 
Similar in function to Title 31 U.S.C. § 1301 is Title 
31 § 1532, which governs the withdrawal of funds from one 
appropriation and the subsequent crediting to another fund.  
The procedure, unless authorized by law, is prohibited. 
Removing the purpose or “color of money” tag from 
appropriated funds and allowing their transfer between 
appropriations is essential for the operation of the 
proposed escrow account.  In the design of the operational 
procedures, the enabling legislation could allow for the 
removal of the “color tag” at initial transfer or during 
the obligation period.  Figures 6 and 7 graphically 
demonstrate these possibilities. 
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Additionally, there are three specific codes within 
Title 31 that add the element of time to appropriations.  
Title 31 U.S.C. § 1502, § 1552, and § 1553 define various 
aspects of the obligation period and the procedures 
required when the availability period expires.  The 
obligation period, or the time in which valid obligations 
can be made, varies and is dependent on the type of 
appropriation.  As an example, O&M funds can be obligated 
for a period of one year, while military construction 
(MILCON) funds have a five-year obligation period. 
 














































Within the continuum of possibilities for new 
legislation enacted, as part of the establishment of the 
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Navy escrow account, there are the two extremes:  the funds 
retain their fiscal year identity or the funds lose their 
fiscal year identity.  Figure 8 highlights the relationship 
between flexibility and probability of gaining approval for 
the various options.   
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The previous section presented the statutory barriers 
to the implementation of the Navy escrow account.  Although 
they are significant, they represent only a portion of the 
implementation equation.  The second aspect, and part of 
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the strategic imperatives associated with the Sea 
Enterprise initiative, is changing the existing culture.17 
 
Cultural Barriers in the Department of the Navy 
There are three prevailing cultural barriers within 
the DoN/DoD:  1) the “spend it or lose it” mentality, 2) 
the use of budget execution as an evaluation tool, and 3) 
the reluctance to adopt a corporate perspective.  First, 
the “spend it or lose it” mentality throughout all 
government organizations is well documented.  The common 
anecdotal belief is that any funds unobligated in the 
current year of execution will be instantly reduced from 
next year’s budget.  With the extreme competition for 
funds, it is not unreasonable for financial managers to 
assume that unobligated funds place their programs at risk 
for future funding. 
Second, within the DoN’s current evaluation system, 
there is not a standard metric for evaluating the financial 
management performance of the officers charged with budget 
execution.18  The level of effort placed on evaluating this 
skill set, excluding comptrollers, budget officers, large 
program managers, etc., consists of nothing more than 
checking the balance in the account at the end of the 
fiscal year.  If the account is empty (without being 
overspent), the officer with the responsibility for that 
account is deemed successful.  Although this is an 
oversimplification, it is close to the truth for many 
operational commands. 
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Finally, there will be resistance to adopting a 
“corporate perspective” towards relinquishing budget 
authority.  Some of the resistance will be simply an 
unwillingness to make local sacrifices for the greater 
good.  However, collective efforts often result in a 
diffusion of responsibility, as no one individual is 
directly responsible for the success or failure of the 
program.  Without a financial target or direct 
accountability, people may not feel the need to perform or 
contribute (deindividuation).19 
 
Cultural Barriers in Congress 
The cultural barriers with Congress center on two 
issues:  the erosion of the congressional power base, 
including their ability to maintain the intent of the 
original appropriations, and their responsibilities to 
constituents, political party, and party leaders. 
The proposed Navy escrow account is a return to the 
principles of Alexander Hamilton and the Federalists who 
argued for lump sump appropriations back in the earliest 
days of the United States.20  It represents, to some extent, 
a shift away from current practices of line item 
specificity and a mechanism for bypassing congressional 
intent. 
This attack on congressional intent will be difficult 
to stop at the DoN, as approval of a “DoN only” escrow 
account is unlikely.  It must be assumed that any escrow 
account would be established for the DoD as a whole, and 
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possibly, by default, desired by each major agency within 
the federal government. 
With $775 billion proposed in discretionary spending 
for FY2004, if only half of one percent is transferred into 
various escrow accounts, $3.875 billion would be out of the 
direct control of the full House and Senate (for the DoN, 
the same percentage represents over $573 million in 
transferred funds).21  In addressing the issue of control 
and intent, it is important to view the proposed escrow 
account for what it is, as well as the precedent it 
establishes. 
The second cultural barrier is the impact of local 
and/or partisan politics.  Deals between Congressmen and 
Senators are part of the appropriations process.  The 
potential for projects to be delayed or accelerated, funds 
to be transferred into different states and districts, may 
create potential battles during the notification process.  
They may be purely geographic in nature, along party lines, 
or in response to the concerns of constituents.  The 
proposed Navy escrow account has the potential for 
circumventing the original agreements and intent contained 
in the Defense Appropriations Acts.  Therefore, problems 
may arise during any attempt to obligate escrow funds. 
Confronting these cultural problems, both within the 
DoN/DoD and Congress, will require tangible and 
institutionalized procedures, exceptional leadership and 
education, combined with a sustained and consistent focus 
over time.  There are no automatic solutions in confronting 
cultural change of this magnitude.  However, strategies for 
managing the cultural change process can increase the 
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probability of successfully implementing an escrow account 
mechanism. 
 
Conclusions and Possibilities 
The proposed Navy escrow account, as envisioned, would 
provide financial managers with the incentive to generate 
cost savings and the means by which those funds could be 
utilized for the greater good of the DoN.  By providing the 
means by which unobligated funds may be retained, 
transferred, and subsequently obligated, the escrow account 
will help eliminate the often-wasteful practices that occur 
at the end of each fiscal year.  Instead of rushing to 
obligate funds for fear of losing budget authority in 
future years, prudent financial stewards may recapitalize 
those funds to replace an aging fleet of ships, aircraft, 
and facilities.  Additionally, by establishing targets 
during the POM build and allowing for transfer of funds 
throughout the year of execution, the account provides the 
DoN/DoD increased flexibility to actively manage budget 
execution and to gain the most benefit from the funds 
appropriated. 
In researching the barriers to implementation, 
programs that are similar in function to the proposed 
escrow account, and potential account operations, five 
strategic imperatives stand out as being critical.  
Collectively, they provide the focus for successfully 
lobbying Congress, designing an implementation strategy, 
and controlling the funds within the escrow account 
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• Make Congress an ally – work with and not 
around congressional concerns. 
• Focus must remain on operational excellence – 
the desire to generate savings cannot replace 
the need to maintain and improve current 
capabilities. 
• To fully leverage generated savings, control of 
escrow account funds must reside at the 
corporate level. 
• Communication and education on financial 
management issues and challenges throughout the 
DoN/DoD are essential. 
• The change process must be actively managed. 
 
The proposed account represents transformational 
change for the business processes within the DoN, DoD, and 
the federal government.  It provides not only increased 
flexibility, but also increased accountability.  In the 
current and projected fiscal environments, maximizing the 
resources provided to the DoN is essential for maintaining 
the current infrastructure and operational capability.  
With an increasingly aging fleet of ships and aircraft, 
reviewing existing financial mechanisms through a different 
lens may provide the only means of effectively 
recapitalizing current assets and obtaining the force 
structure envisioned by Sea Power 21. 
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